

## Democratic Theory

**Brownlee, Jason, Hereditary Succession in Modern Autocracies, *World Politics*, 59 (4), July 2007, pp. 595-628.**

Hereditary succession, the conventional method for preserving monarchies, has also been used to perpetuate republic-style democracies. With an original data set of 258 post-World War II nonmonarchical autocrats, the author tests Gordon Tullock's hypothesis that hereditary succession appeals to the ruler and to nonfamilial elites wary of a leadership struggle. The full data and close comparisons of succession outcomes are consistent with Tullock's account. In the absence of prior experience selecting a ruler through a party, regime elites accepted filial heirs apparent; when the incumbent had arisen from a party, his successor predominantly emerged from that organisation. Among twenty-two cases of potential hereditary succession, variations in institutional history account for 77 percent of succession outcomes. Where the ruler preceded the party, five rulers in seven cases groomed sons and all five sons took office. In contrast, where the party predated the ruler, incumbents successfully installed sons in only three of fifteen cases.

**Fung, Archon, 'Democratic Theory and Political Science: A Pragmatic Method of Constructive Engagement', *American Political Science Review*, 101 (3), August, 2007, pp. 443-457.**

This article develops two conceptual tools to synthesize democratic theory and the empirical study of institutions. The first is a standard to assess conceptions of democracy, called pragmatic equilibrium. A conception of democracy is in pragmatic equilibrium just in case the consequences of its institutional prescriptions realize its values well and better than any other feasible institutional arrangements across a wide range of problems and contexts. Pragmatic equilibrium is a kind of Rawlsian reflective equilibrium. The second is a method of practical reasoning about the consequences of alternative institutional choices that brings conceptions of democracy closer to pragmatic equilibrium. These two ideas are then applied to four conceptions of democracy- minimal, aggregative, deliberative and participatory- and to two governance problems- deciding rules of political structure and minority tyranny to show, how each

conception can improve through reflection on the empirical consequences of various institutional arrangements.

**Marks, Jonathan, 'Rousseau's Discriminatory Defence of Compassion', *American Political Science Review*, 101 (4), November 2007, pp. 727-739.**

Political theorists from Martha Nausbaum to Amitai Etzioni appeal to compassion as a basis that liberalism otherwise lacks for refraining from exploiting and even for helping others. However, critics like Clifford Orwin and Richard Boyd have raised this question: is compassion too weak and indiscriminating to rely on in politics? Jean- Jacques Rousseau's account of compassion helps answer it. Rousseau understands compassion as a useful manifestation of the otherwise dangerous desire to extend the self and show signs of power. Consequently, he considers compassion's relative weakness, strength and explains, how it can be supplemented and complemented by other, independent motives for serving others, including gratitude, friendship and obligation. Compassion's weakness also makes it less likely than self-love, narrowly conceived to overwhelm reason. Rousseau excels compassion's contemporary defenders in his awareness of the complex relationship between compassion and other social passions and of the dangers that his understanding of compassion addresses.

**Honig, Bonnie, 'Between Decision and Deliberation: Political Paradox in Democratic Theory', *American Political Science Review*, 101 (1), February 2007, pp. 1-18.**

Deliberative democratic theorists (in this essay, Seyla Benhabib and Jurgen Habermas) seek to resolve, manage or transcend paradoxes of democratic legitimation or constitutional democracy. Other democratic theorists, such as Chantal Mouffe, embrace such paradoxes and affirm their irreducibility. Deliberativists call that position 'decisionism'. This essay examines the promise and limits of these various efforts by way of a third paradox: Rousseau's paradox of politics, whose many workings are traced through Book II, Chapter 7 of the Social Contract. This last paradox cannot be resolved, transcended, managed or even affirmed as an irreducible binary conflict. The paradox of politics names not a clash between

two logics or norms but a vicious circle of chicken and egg (which comes first-good people or good law?) It has the happy effect of reorienting democratic theory: toward the material conditions of political practice, the unavoidable will of the people who are also always a multitude and the not only regulative but also productive powers of law.